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Leading from the Rear? A Theoretical Analysis of the 
Contingent Bureaucratic Conservatism of the NZCTU 
Leadership -
Brian S. Roper* 
This article outlines the theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of full-time trade 
union officials, considers some of the major criticisms of this theory, and then argues that a 
qualified version of this theory is essential to making sense of the role played by the NZCTU 
leadership in industrial relations. 
Introduction 
The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions was established as a national trade union 
federation at its inau,gural conference in October 1987. It united, for the first time, the 
overwhelming majority of public and private sector unions (Wilson, 1991). By 1989 public 
and private sector union membership had risen to 648,825 representing 63 percent of the full-
time workforce (Harbridge et al . , 1994: 175-6). Hence both in tettns of membership numbers 
and coverage as well as organisation and resources, the new federation was potentially the 
most powerful in New Zealand's labour history (Brosnan et al., 1990: 102, 124-25). 
While the membership and resources of th~e NZCTU are considerable, throughout its short 
history the new federation has had to contend with an extremely difficult and hostile 
economic, industrial and political ~environment. During the period from the election of the 
fourth Labour Government in 1984 until the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act 
in 1991, the NZCTU faced: high levels of unemployment; the decline of industries in which 
the traditionally more militant unions were based; a rise in business political activism and the 
emergence of industrial militancy amongst employers; a shift in the prevailing economic 
orthodoxy from Keynesianism to neoclassicism and within industrial relations from pluralism 
to unitarism; and the implementation of a New Right policy agenda by Labour and National 
governments which is essentially pro-business and anti-worker. 1 
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The National Party, Business Roundtable, Employers Federation, Treasury and new-· ......... _ 
economists deny that this policy agenda has mainly benefited a wealthy and powerful minority 
in New Zealand society. However, the overwhelming bulk of empirical data shows that the 
only group to have experienced a substantial rise in real disposable household income since 
1984 is the top quintile. The majority of workers have experienced either a decline or, at 
least, no significant rise in real income, deterioration of their conditions of employment, and 
greater employment insecurity. In fact, it is undeniable that income and wealth has become 
much more unequally distributed since 1984.2 
This situation raises some interesting questions because, despite the evident potential power 
of the NZCTU, and the fact that these policies have been clearly detrimental to the interests 
of the workers it represents, it consistently failed to successfully oppose and defeat any of the 
major policy initiatives of the fourth Labour Government or the succeeding National 
Government. In particular, during the period leading up to the passage of the ECA in May 
1991 the NZCTU leadership failed to organise and lead the kind of generalised strike action 
that would, at the very least, have forced the National Government to substantially amend, if 
not withdraw, the legislation. In the industrial relations literature there have been remarkably 
few attempts to address the key questions which this raises: Why has the NZCTU leadership 
acted in such a conservative and timid manner in response to economic, social and industrial 
relations policies which have resulted in declining or stagnant real incomes, a deterioration 
of conditions of employment, and less employment security for the majority of the workforce? 
And, in particular, why did the NZCTU, despite the breadth and depth of working class 
opposition to the Employment Contracts Bill, completely fail to force the government to make 
any significant changes to the legislation? 
Sound answers to these questions can be provided through systematic historical research 
guided and infottned by the theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of full-time 
union officials (also known as the rank and filist perspective). Of course, bureaucratic 
conservatism is not the only factor which must be considered when investigating the course 
of particular industrial disputes and therefore it is always important to analyse the wider 
historical context of a dispute. This includes the general state of the economy, prevailing 
balance of power between employers and workers, dominant economic orthodoxy, and policy 
agenda of the government. Hence explanatory accounts of the conservatism of the NZCTU 
leadership, if they are to be convincing, must combine theoretical analysis of the contingent 
bureaucratic conservatism of full-time trade union officials in the industrial relations systems 
of advanced capitalism with systematic historical research which disentangles the concrete 
interplay of economic, class, ideological and political forces specific to any particular dispute. 
Th,e primary objective of this article is to highlight the relevance and potential fruitfulness of 
the theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of trade union officials for the study 
of labour history and industrial relations in New Zealand. Specifically, the theory can be used 
2 The growth of income inequality during the 1980s is widely established (Income Distribution Group, 
1990; Department of Statistics, 1993: ch.15, Depa1tntentofStatistics, Key Statistics, August 1994:42-43 
and December 1995: 49-50; Economist, November 1994: 20; Kelsey, 1995: 256-59; Roper, in press b). 
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It is extremely difficult for union members to remove unpopular high ranking officials even 
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To sum up. Full-time trade union officials constitute a distinctive social stratum, with its own 
interests, in capitalist societies. Because of the bargaining functions that they perforn1 within 
the industrial relations system, and because of their conditions of work and isolation from the 
rank and file, union officials tend towards conservatism in industrial practice, particularly 
during large scale industrial disputes. It is important to recognise that the tendency towards 
bureaucratic conservatism within trade unions is precisely a tendency. There have been, and 
will continue to be, significant exceptions. Furthermore, bureaucratic conservatism is 
histo.rically contingent since union officials are subject to contradictory, conflicting and 
changing sets of social, economic and political pressures. 
Criticisms of the theory of contingent bureaucratic conservatism 
The theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of full-time trade union officials, 
commonly referred to as the "rank and filist perspective", has been subject to extensive 
criticism (Heery and Fosh, 1990; Heery and Kelly, 1990; Hyman, 1989: ch.6; Kelly, 1988: 
ch.7; Zeitlin, 1987, 1989a, 1989b). The critics have argued that: i) the ,conservatism of full-
time union officials cannot be explained by reference to the specific nature of officials' 
working lives nor their involvem,ent in collective bargaining; ii) there is no clear divergence 
of interests between the trade union officialdom and the rank and file; iii) there is no clear 
dividing line within the organisational hierarchies of unions between the "officialdom" or 
"union bureaucracy" and the rank and file; iv) union officials are, contrary to the claims of 
rank and filists, actually responsive to the wishes of rank ,and file members; and v) full-time 
officials do not necessarily tend to conservatism and rank and file members to militancy. In 
this section of the article these criticisms will themselves be subject to critical scrutiny. 
Kelly (1988) argues that the conservatism of full-time union officials cannot be explained by 
reference to the specific nature of officials' working lives which generally involve higher pay 
and· greater employment security than that experienced by union members, geographic and 
organisational isolation from rank and file members, and the power and prestig~e associated 
with union leadership. In particular, the higher rate of pay that some officials get relative to 
the workers that they represent cannot be a factor explaining officials' conservatism since high 
paid workers can be industrially militant and low paid work~ers quiescent (1988: 161-65). 
In response the more sophisticated rank and filists accept that there is no mechanical 
relationship between high or low wages and high or low rates of industrial militancy amongst 
sections of the workforce. Rather, they argue that, regardless of whether or not an official 
earns more than rank and file members, the overall ~effect of the officials' working conditions 
is to isolate him or her from those he or she represents (Bramble, 1993: 17-21 ). As Callinicos 
observes: 
Full-time officials are remov,ed from the discipline of the shop floor, from the dirt and dangers 
often found there, from the immediate .conflicts with the supervisor and manager, from the 
fellowship of their workmates, to the very different environment of an office. Even if they 
are not paid more than their members (and they usually are), their earnings no longer depend 
on the ups and downs of capitalist production ... If a plant is ~closed the official who 
negotiates the redundancies will not get the sack. Constantly closeted with management, full-
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timers come to see negotiation, compromise, the reconciliation of capital and labour as the very 
stuff of trade unionism. Struggle appears as a disruption of the bargaining process, a nuisance 
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c.e another 1989: 158; Kelly, 1988:154-155; Zeitlin, 1989a: 49). Rather 
being a clearly defined bureaucracy separate from a coherent and conscious rank 
in1ra-11nion relations are highly complex, with shifting interest groups and 
tendencies apparent at many levels. In this vein Hy1nan (1989: 158) has argued 
"the problem of 'bureaucracy' denotes not so much a distinct stratum of personnel as a 
which permeates the whole practice of trade unionism." 
it is true that there is no simple and clear cut distinction between the rank and file 
... "'&& officialdom. Unions have complex bureaucratic organisational which 
pass ordinary rank and file members, unpaid workplace delegates, elected regioaal 
members, regionally paid organisers, and full-time national officers. The 
problen1s involved in distinguishing between the union officialdom and the rank 
arise when one moves down the union hierarchy to regional organisers, elected unpaid 
office holders, and workplace delegates. If one must draw a "demarcation line" 
the rank and file and the union officialdom, then a key consideration is whether a 
is paid or unpaid, and if it is paid then by whom (in Britain some shop stewards are 
by their employer while working full-time on union business). As a general rule all full-
paid union officials form part of the union bureaucracy, although it is the case that the 
, like the rank and file, is heterogeneous. 
the tendency to bureaucratic conservatism grows stronger as one moves up the 
bierarchy (although, obvious-y, there are some exceptions). For example, regional 
are likely to be more responsive to rank and file demands than national officers. 
, regioaal organisers are typically bureaucratically appointed and are dependent for 
positions on the continued patronage of the national leadership. This article is primarily 
with the conse1 vatism of the NZCTU leadership, and there can be no doubt that 
bers of the NZCTU's Natioaal Executive, and other full-time paid national office 
who are in Wellington, are "union bureaucrats" in the classical sense. 
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The rank and filists argue that, despite the organisational complexity of some unions, and 
existence of other sources of intra-union conflict, there is still a discernible divergence 
interests between the working-class membership of trade unions and full-time office 
officials (Bramble, 1993: 17). This divergence of interests arises because the driving force 
of economic activity in capitalist society is, given the competitive war which is waged on both 
commodity and capital markets, the necessity of firms to re•na;n profitable. Profit in capitalist 
society is the principal, but not the only, phenomenal form assumed by surplus-value. 
Surplus-value is the monetary form of the social surplus product specific to a capitalist 
society. In other words, workers produce a surplus product over and above their own 
subsistence needs, and the exchange-value of this surplus product is equivalent to surplus-
value. The surplus-value produced by workers in capitalist production is appropriated by 
capitalists by virtue of their exclusive ownership (in the sense of effective control) of the 
means of production. Hence the divergence of interests between rank and file union members 
and union officials arises because "the task of trade unions ... is to defend workers' interests 
within capitalist relations of production, within the wages system. The unions exist to 
improve the tetiits on which the worker is exploited, not to put an end to exploitation." (Cliff 
and Gluckstein, 1986: 26) 
Agreements reached between unions and employers through collective bargaining within 
capitalism, even where such agreements involve substantial improvements in wages and 
conditions, only have a marginal impact on the overall process of surplus-extraction. The 
interests of union officials are inextricably linked to the continued maintenance of legislation 
codifying agreements reached through collective negotiation of the buying and selling of 
labour power, which in tum depends upon the continued subordination and exploitation of 
workers within the production process. In short, collective agreements may be reached with 
employers which do reflect, to a limited and partial extent, workers' desire for higher wages 
and better conditions of employment. But such agreements can never more than partially 
realise workers' interests because they have fundamental interests (inter alia securing the "full 
fruits of their labour", distributing this according to need rather tban profit, and democratic 
workplace control) which are essentially anti-capitalist. 
Zeitlin argues that the rank and filist perspective is inadequate because there is "pervasive 
evidence" that full-time officials actually are responsive to the wishes of rank and file 
members, with the result that it has been possible "to keep internal tensions within tolerable 
bounds" (1989a: 58-9). This criticism has some force against simplified versions of the rank 
and filist perspective, but not against those which recognise that the conservatism of officials 
is contingent because they are subject to contradictory and conflicting social forces, the 
relative weight of which can change rapidly over time. In unions with a high degree of 
internal democracy and rank and file participation in union affairs, or during industrial 
disputes where the rank and file is placing considerable pressure on their officials to act, the 
officials may be responsive to rank and file demands. But the weight of historical evidence 
suggests that during large scale industrial disputes union officials tend to adopt a more 
conservative posture than the rank and file (see for example, Bramble, 1993; Callincos, 1995; 
Callinicos and Simons, 1985; Cliff and Gluckstein, 1986; Harman, 1988; Moody, 1988; Kerry, 
1980; Robertson, 1988). 
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Finally, the rank and filist perspective has been criticised for focusing excessively on internal 
conflict within unions and failing to place sufficient weight on the frequently hostile external 
social, economic and political context in which unions have to operate. Once again this 
criticism is wide of the mark. Rank and filists r·eadily acknowledge that when considering 
any specific dispute, particularly where the union has lost, it is important not to focus 
exclusively on the role of the union officials. It is necessary to place the dispute within a 
wider societal and historical context (see for example, Roper, 1990). 
Relevance of the theory? Explaining the timidity and conservatism of the 
NZCTU leadership 
As mentioned earlier, from the outset the NZCTU faced the hostility of employers who had 
been growing increasingly industrially militant and politically active throughout the 1980s and 
Labour and National governments intent on ramming through a comprehensive programme 
of 'New Right economic, social and industrial r·elations policy reforn1 which was clearly 
detrimental to the interests of workers (Roper, 1993: 160-62; Walsh, 1993: 184-89). In 
response to these attacks, the NZCTU leadership continually emphasised the need for 
negotiation and compromise with both employers and government, while demonstrating a 
complete disdain for industrial action and political protest. It is the central contention of this 
articl·e that the theory of the contingent bureaucratic conservatism of the union officialdom 
both explains, and is empirically corroborated by, the largely timid, passive, conciliatory, and 
conservative response of the NZCTU leadership to the succession of attacks on its members 
by the fourth Labour Government and following National Government. While it is not 
possible to provide a detailed empirically grounded account of the perfortnance of the NZCTU 
leadership from 1987 to the present, it is possible to make a number of general observations. 
First, the theory of bureaucratic conservatism emphasises that the union bureaucracy is a 
distinct social stratum with its own interests which is, particularly in the upper echelons of 
the union federation, subject to minimal rank and file control over its activities. This is 
clearly the case with the NZCTU leadership. Even in tettns of its fortnal structure the 
democratic accountability of the NZCTU leadership to its rank and file members is minimal. 
Unlike the FOL which held annual confer·ences, the NZCTU only holds conferences on a 
biennial basis. The President, Vice President and Secretaryrfreasurer ar·e only subJect to 
election once every four years (less frequently than the Prime Minister!), there is no effective 
constitutional mechanism enabling rank and file members of affiliated unions to remove the 
President or Vice President from office for inadequate perfortnance, there is no constitutional 
requirement for union officials to vote in accord with the wishes of the majority of their 
members in special meetings of affiliates, nor is there any constitutional requirement that 
affiliated unions be internally democratic (NZCTU, 1994: 49-73). In short, effective 
democracy is virtually non-existent within the NZCTU's organizational structure. 
The full significance of the lack of d·emocracy within the NZCTU becom~es clear when it is 
recognised that the majority of rank and file members failed to support the leadership's two 
major "strategic responses" to attacks by Labour and National governments between 1987 and 
1991. In response to the economic restructuring and public sector refortn of the fourth 
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The response of the NZCTU to the election of N ill dut I 
governments' rapid introduction of the Employment ·~ 
by the discouragement of industrial action and political that at dle c:or. of 
unionism. In this regard, Bray and Neilson observe that "there see.-~ little room to 
a more naditional action-oriented militant politics, since that would tmd ··• 
movement's credibility as a mature economic partn~ at a level (1996: 78).• 
meant that in response to the State Sector Act of 1988 and the associated drive of the 
Government for mass redundancies amongst public sector workers, "Tbe Nzcru waa 
to show that it could resolve disputes rather escalate them and it · open 
(1996: 77)." The abject failure of the NZCTU to defend the of its 
opposition to the anti-working class policies of the fourth Labour Government was 
significant because as Dannin (1995) and Bramble and Heal (in press) have showa: 
The CTU' s formal and institutional alliance with Labour left it unable to criticise Labour when 
it privatised government agencies and deregulated industries. In tum, by failiDg to keep faith 
with its membership and by failing to promote their interests within their party, the CTU 
became estranged from its membership and allies and thus weakened. A large number of the 
public looked to the CTU for leadership and heard nothing (Dannin, 199S: 39). 
Even after the election of a National Government clearly committed to sweeping attacks 
the bade union movement, the NZCTU response was to seek negotiation and 
According to Robyn Haultain, a for·rtter CTU counsel: 
There was a lot of internal discussion [within the NZCTU] about whether we should start 
meeting with Bill Birch, from the National Party, and with people who we knew were going 
to be at the forefront of the charge as far as voluntary unionisn1 and so on wu concerned. 
0 • 0 All of the people who worked in the technical services division had a very sbong opinion 
that we ought to be meeting with Birch and as many other National Party people u we could 
(interview cited by Dannin, 1995: 40)0 
While these meetings did not eventuate, the fact that they were seriously considered at this 
crucial juncture highlights the "negotiate and compromise" ethos of the NZCTU. 
From the outset it was widely recognised that the central provisions of the Employment 
Contracts Bill would fundamentally underrnine union membership and coverage, · 
collective action and bargaining power.4 The bill was introduced in conjuuction 
significant reductions in benefit rates and the introduction of much harsher eligibility ._... 
(Boston and Dalziel, 1992). In particular, a six month stand down period was 1br 
the unemployment benefit for workers who left their jobs "without a good and 
reason" or lost their job through "misconduct" (Stephens, 1992: 109). Workers 
action were also ruled to be ineligible for the unemployment benefit. Early ia 199 
popularity of National, as reflected in opinion polls, declined to an historic low 
governing party. The implementation of the New Right policy agenda from 1984 
with the resulting substantial upward redistribution of income and the "dowa 
4 In the event, total union membership declined from 603, 118 in May 1991 to 362,200 Ia 
with a decline in union density (full-time equivalent union memben to the total 
percent to 210 7 percent (Crawford, et al., 1996: 188; Harbridge, 1993). 
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welfare state and public service, generated widespread anger amongst the working class. But 
this anger remained latent because of the extensive demoralisation of rank and file union 
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The fo11nally stated position of the NZCTU leadership 
individual unions to decide what action, if any, they would take 
In reality, however, key figures in the leadership, partic•darly 
President Angela Foulkes and officials from the Engineers UDiOD, 
over the struggle against the ECB. That influence was directed 
militants, unions and officials who were pushing for a general ~·· 
press; Dannin, 1995: 84-85). 
On the 18th of April 1991 a Special Affiliates Conference was held to detertnine the 
of action that would be adopted by unions affiliated to the NZCTU in oppositioa to tile 
Immediately prior to the conference the NZCTU leadership signalled its 
general strike and it did not present the conference with a proposal for ntdionally 
strike action. In the conference itself the national office holders in ~or tmions block 
250,122 to 190,910 against the Service Workers Federation's proposal for a 24 
nationwide strike (New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, 16: 203). This decision 
an immediate demoralising effect because rank and file union members were well 
nothing less than a general strike would force the govetnment to withdraw or amend t1te 
legislation. This conference decision effectively meant that the union movement had 
an historic opportunity to at least slow down the continued implementation of the 
policy agenda. It also constituted a travesty of the most elementary principles of 
Officials block voted against the proposal for a general strike despite the fact that they had 
no mandate from their rank and file members_ to do so. Indeed, the majority of rank and file 
members in these unions would have endorsed and supported such action. 
The arguments that have been made in defence of the role played by the NZCI'U in tbe 
struggle against the ECA are not convincing. First, leading figures in the NZCI'U that 
there was insufficient rank and file support for a general strike, that if a seaeral 
strike had been called it would have been unsuccessful and merely highlighted the 
of the unions. While it must be acknowledged that there is insufficient evidence to CODCJua. 
ively prove that a majority of rank and file union members supported a ge•,mral ~ 
is far less, if any, evidence to suggest that a majority actually opposed strike 
Easton (1995) among others, argues that a general m~ite would not have 
government to withdraw or amend the legislation. It is true that a 24 hour gaae1ld 
its own would not have been sufficient to force the gove1nment to amend the 
a successful general strike would have raised workers' confidence aad C011kl 
followed by further generalised strike action and mass protests. Jivea 
depth of popular opposition to the government at the time, and the 
mass support for the initial general strike, it is possible that key of 
have decided to stay out longer than 24 hours without direction from 
face of such opposition it is likely that the government would have, at the •t 
the legislation in order to defuse the situation (it was subsequeotly 
of its initiatives in superannuation and health). 
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